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After Grutter Things Get Interesting!
The American Debate Over Affirmative Action Is
Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas From Abroad
CLARK D. CUNNINGHAM*
The Connecticut Law Review has decided at a propitious time to devote
its annual symposium to international perspectives on affirmative action:
the United States Supreme Court has finally begun to acknowledge the
usefulness of looking at the law of other countries and has also finally bro-
ken up the logjam blocking constructive policy analysis and development
about affirmative action.
Until recently the U.S. Supreme Court generally either ignored the ex-
istence of non-American legal systems or rejected the possible relevance of
comparative law with dismissive disdain. Typical of the latter is a com-
ment by Justice Powell, concurring in United States v. Richardson,' an
important Watergate era case that dismissed a lawsuit challenging the se-
crecy of the CIA's budget by taking a very narrow view of standing that
made a provision of the Constitution effectively unenforceable.' After
asserting in the main text of his concurrence that "[u]nrestrained standing
in federal taxpayer or citizen suits would create a remarkably illogical sys-
tem of judicial supervision of the coordinate branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment," Justice Powell added in a footnote that "[slome Western Euro-
pean democracies have experimented with forms of constitutional judicial
review in the abstract, see, e.g., M. Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Con-
temporary World 71-72 (1971), but that has not been our experience, and I
W. Lee Burge Professor of Law & Ethics, Georgia State University College of Law, Atlanta,
Georgia. Email: cdcunningham@gsu.edu.
1418 U.S. 166,180 (1974).
2 Id. at 167-70, 179. The plaintiff sought to enforce Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitu-
tion which states that a "regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time." Id. at 167-68. The Court appeared to acknowledge that
if this plaintiff "is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so" and offered the plaintiff the
cold consolation that his lack of standing "does not impair the right to assert his views in the political
forum or at the polls." Id. at 179.
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think for good reasons."3
In 1997 Justice Scalia stated flatly in a majority opinion for the Court
that "comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution .... 4 However, when in 2002 he voiced a similar position, it
was in a dissenting opinion. The case was Atkins v. Virginia,5 in which the
Court reversed an earlier decision and held that execution of mentally re-
tarded defendants was "cruel and unusual punishment" that violated the
Eighth Amendment.6 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens referred not
only to evidence of a growing consensus in the United States against exe-
cution of the mentally retarded, but also to "the world community, [where]
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally re-
tarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."7 Even though this nod
to other countries appeared only in a footnote, it attracted the ire of Justice
Scalia, who responded in his dissent by saying (in the text): "Equally ir-
relevant are the practices of the 'world community,' whose notions of jus-
tice are (thankfully) not always those of our people."'
By 2003 it was clear that the disdain for comparative law displayed by
Justice Scalia in Atkins was not shared even by the moderate "swing vote"
members of the Court. When the Court reversed another precedent,
striking down a criminal statute aimed at homosexual conduct in Lawrence
v. Texas,9 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion pointedly stated, this time in
the text, that "The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted
as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries."10 Similarly,
less than a week before the conference held for this symposium issue, Jus-
tice O'Connor was reported to say in a public speech that the Supreme
Court "has its ear to the world."" She went on to predict that "over time
we will rely increasingly, or take notice at least increasingly, on interna-
tional and foreign courts in examining domestic issues."'"
3 Id. at 189, 191 n.10 (Powell, J. concurring).
4Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902, 921 n.1 1 (1997). Justice Scalia was responding to a
suggestion in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion that the experience of other countries may "cast an
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem--in this case the
problem of reconciling central authority with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a
smaller constituent governmental entity." Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
6 Id. at 321.
7 Id. at 306, 316-17 & n.21.
8 Id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003).
10 Id. at 2483.
1I Bill Rankin, U.S. Justice is Honored: O'Connor Says Court Has Its Ear to the World, AT-
LANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Oct. 29, 2003, at A3.
12 Id. According to another report of the same speech, Justice O'Connor also said, "No institution
of government can afford to ignore the rest of the world .... The differences between our nations are
fewer and less important than our similarities." Jonathan Ringel, O'Connor Speech Puts Foreign Law
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Justice O'Connor did not, however, make reference to the law of other
countries in the opinion she authored for the Court upholding the affirma-
tive action program used by the University of Michigan Law School in
Grutter v. Bollinger,3 nor did any of the other members of the Court. 4
There had been indications that the Court might consider the relevance
of comparative law to affirmative action. In 1999 Justice Ginsburg chose
affirmative action as the topic of her Cardozo Memorial Lecture to the Bar
of the City of New York, in which she described affirmative action as an
"international human rights dialogue."' 5 She described in some detail the
approach to affirmative action in India and Europe and concluded with the
assertion that "comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task of
interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights."' 6 When it appeared
in 2001 that the Court was likely to use its third consideration of the Ada-
rand Constructors7 lawsuit to resolve many of the unsettled issues sur-
rounding affirmative action, the National Organization of Women Legal
Defense and Education Fund (perhaps encouraged by Justice Ginsburg's
Cardozo Memorial Lecture) chose to devote their entire amicus brief to the
proposition that international and comparative law were relevant sources of
Center Stage, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Oct. 31, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Fulton
File.
13 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). It is tempting, however, to wonder whether a comparison with India's
approach to affirmative action may have influenced Justice O'Connor's decision to add the much-
discussed penultimate paragraph of the Court's opinion stating that "[w]e expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary .. " Id. at 2347. According to a New
York Times Magazine article by Professor Jeffrey Rosen, Justice O'Connor had discussed affirmative
action with a group of visiting justices of the Supreme Court of India not long before the Grutter opin-
ion was written. Jeffrey Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2003, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 52. He gave the following account:
I had been invited to give a talk about racial preferences for the justices of the Supreme Court of
India, who were in Washington on a judicial exchange program. When I arrived at the conference
room, I found ... that the assembled Indian justices were accompanied by their hosts, Justices
O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer, who decided at the last moment to come along for the discus-
sion ....
Justice O'Connor... seemed skeptical of affirmative action during the question-and-answer
period that followed. When an Indian Supreme Court justice was asked how long India's caste-
based quota system would continue, he said the quotas would never end. O'Connor raised her
eyebrow in response and gave me a meaningful glance of reproach.
Id. at 52, 55.
14 Justice Ginsburg did refer in her concurring opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, to international
law, specifically the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
ti6n. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
15Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human
Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 253 (1999).
16 Id. at 273-81, 282.
17 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 523 U.S. 941 (2001) (granting certiorari).
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interpretive guidance for that case."
How could comparison with other countries be helpful in thinking
about the issues addressed in the two Michigan affirmative action cases 9
and the issues that need to be addressed in their wake? A "globalization"
approach to law need not be an "import model" where domestic law would
be replaced or modified by adoption of something developed in another
country. The import approach should be avoided for many reasons. Not
only does it often imply cultural imperialism but it also entails overcoming
at least two very challenging hurdles: (1) showing that the foreign ap-
proach is successful in that country, and (2) showing that the many differ-
ences between that country and our country do not preclude effective trans-
ferability. However, one need not hurtle over such formidable obstacles to
enter the comparative path. A sufficient reason for comparative study is
simply to get us to think in new ways-to ask new and different questions
and to develop new approaches to answering our existing questions.
I proposed this "new questions" justification for a comparative ap-
proach to thinking about affirmative action as the first speaker at the No-
vember 6, 2003 symposium hosted by the Connecticut Law Review where
preliminary versions of the articles in this issue were presented for discus-
sion. Mark Tushnet spoke later as part of the same panel, and he re-
sponded rather directly to my suggestion in a presentation that generally
cautioned against the use of international comparison for domestic pur-
poses."0 He concluded that using such comparison as a way to generate
new questions might not hurt much, if done cautiously, but might not help
much either. Asserting that most of the useful questions about affirmative
action were already "rattling around" in domestic discourse, he doubted
18 Brief of Amici Curiae NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lawyers Committee for Hu-
man Rights, and Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic in Support of Respondents,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (No. 00-730) available at
http://www.nowldef.orglhtml/issues/whrlpdf/amicusbrief.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review). The brief is also available at http://law.gsu.edu/Equality/ (last visited
March 4, 2004) [hereinafter Rethinking Equality Website]. For the two earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions in the Adarand Constructors litigation see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216
(2000) (per curiam) (reversing the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and allowing petitioner's cause of
action to proceed) and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (vacating the judgment
of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and remanding for further proceedings).
19 The two companion cases are Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (holding that the af-
firmative action approach used for the University of Michigan Law School was not violative of the
Equal Protection Clause because it was narrowly tailored to further the compelling state interest in
obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2411 (2003) (holding that the affirmative action approach used for the University of Michigan
undergraduate program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
was not narrowly tailored).
20 See Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cautionary Notes, with
Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649 (2004) (offering cautionary notes about the use
of transnational comparisons in domestic constitutional interpretation).
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whether the effort of learning about another country's approach was a cost-
effective way of improving the quality of discourse in the United States on
this subject. Comparative study, he said, was best justified for the intrinsic
interest of learning about the rest of the world.2'
Prompted in part by Professor Tushnet's remarks, I devote the balance
of this article to a preliminary experiment to see if comparative thinking
can generate helpful approaches to several related questions that seem to
"rattle around" among the various opinions in the Grutter case without
reaching any satisfactory resolution.
Which groups should be identified to benefit from affirmative action?
What criteria and procedures should be used to select the groups and define
them? As discussed below, these are considered central questions in In-
dia's legal system which have received a great deal of attention from both
its courts and the executive branch. In contrast, in the United States, these
questions are just beginning to emerge into significance. Both Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy in their dissents in Grutter focused on
the selection of beneficiary groups. Justice Kennedy emphasized testi-
mony by "[former Michigan] Dean [of Admissions] Allan Stillwagon...
[about] the difficulties he encountered in defining racial groups entitled to
benefit under the School's affirmative action policy."' 2 He noted with con-
cern Stillwagon's report that "faculty members were 'breathtakingly cyni-
cal' in deciding who would qualify as a member of underrepresented mi-
"213norities.
Chief Justice Rehnquist focused in his dissent on evidence he believed
indicated that African-American applicants were receiving, without expla-
nation or justification, significantly greater preference from the law school
than Hispanic applicants.
From 1995 through 2000, the Law School admitted be-
tween 1,130 and 1,310 students. Of those, between 13 and 19
were Native American, between 91 and 108 were African-
Americans, and between 47 and 56 were Hispanic. If the
Law School is admitting between 91 and 108 African-
Americans in order to achieve "critical mass," thereby pre-
venting African-American students from feeling "isolated or
like spokespersons for their race," one would think that a
number of the same order of magnitude would be necessary
to accomplish the same purpose for Hispanics and Native
21 Id. at 663 (concluding that comparative constitutional law has intrinsic intellectual interest al-
though its instrumental value may not be large). Professor Tushnet clearly places a high value on a
comparative approach to studying constitutional law, having co-authored a leading textbook in the
field, VICKi C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW (1999).
22 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2373 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).




*.. The school asserts that it "frequently accepts nonmi-
nority applicants with grades and test scores lower than un-
derrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority
applicants) who are rejected."
... Of these 67 individuals, 56 were Hispanic, while only
6 were African-American, and only 5 were Native American.
. . . [I]n 2000, 12 Hispanics who scored between a 159-160
on the LSAT and earned a GPA of 3.00 or higher applied for
admission and only 2 were admitted. Meanwhile, 12 Afri-
can-Americans in the same range of qualifications applied for
admission and all 12 were admitted.
.. Respondents have never offered any race-specific ar-
guments explaining why significantly more individuals from
one underrepresented minority group are needed in order to
achieve "critical mass" or further student body diversity.
They certainly have not explained why Hispanics, who they
have said are among "the groups most isolated by racial bar-
riers in our country," should have their admission capped out
in this manner.24
Although one wonders whether the Chief Justice actually would have
voted to uphold the law school's affirmative action program as long as it
had admitted larger numbers of Hispanic and Native American applicants,
the evidence he cited would seem to call for a response. However, the ma-
jority opinion authored by Justice O'Connor did not really respond to ei-
ther Justice Kennedy or Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns.
Justice O'Connor seemed to waver about the justification for the law
school's selection of African-American, Hispanics and Native Americans
for preferential treatment.25 The majority opinion began by quoting from
the law school's admission policy which sought "diversity" in the student
body in order to "enrich everyone's education., 26  African-Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans were specifically identified not to rem-
edy past discrimination against these groups, but "rather to include students
who may bring to the Law School a perspective different from that of
24Id. at 2366-67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor cited the same
data, showing that the Law School "accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores lower
than underrepresented minority applicants . . . who are rejected," as evidence that "the Law School
seriously weighs many other diversity factors besides race.. Id. at 2344.
25 Id. at 2332 (discussing the "special reference" in the law school's admission policy to "Afri-
can-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans").
26 Id.
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members of groups which have not been the victims of such discrimina-
tion., 27  Thus it would appear that the purpose of the affirmative action
program was to improve the quality of the three-year legal education, with
the beneficiaries being all law students. However, when one moves to the
heart of the majority opinion, the primary concern expressed is that be-
cause of "our Nation's struggle with racial inequality, [minority] students
are . .. less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers" absent race-
conscious admission criteria. 2' According to Justice O'Connor, the harm
that would be caused by this exclusion of minority students was not an
intellectually impoverished education for non-minority law students but
rather a legal profession and leadership elite that fails to be inclusive of "all
racial and ethnic groups":
Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic
groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream
of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.... [L]aw schools
[] represent the training ground for a large number of our Na-
tion's leaders .... In order to cultivate a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the
path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity .... Access to legal
education (and thus the legal profession) must be inclusive of
talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity,
so that all members of our heterogeneous society may par-
ticipate in the educational institutions that provide the train-
ing and education necessary to succeed in America.29
At this point in the majority opinion special consideration in the admis-
sion process for African-American, Hispanics and Native Americans is
justified, not because they are needed for effective education of non-
minority students, but because the inclusion of "all racial and ethnic
groups" in the legal profession, and the establishment of an elite civic lead-
ership, would not otherwise happen.
27 Id. at 2334 (summarizing the testimony of Professor Richard Lempert, who chaired the Law
School's faculty committee that drafted the 1992 admissions policy).
28 Id. at 2344.
29 Id. at 2340-41. One can readily see how Justice O'Connor had by this point in the opinion
moved away from the Law School's articulated purpose by imagining a program in which law schools
hired African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans from all walks of life to attend and partici-
pate in law school classes, as a kind of adjunct faculty. Of course one could doubt whether such an
approach would be as effective a way of educating non-minority students about the relevant experi-
ences of racially oppressed groups as interacting with fellow students from such groups outside the
classroom as well as within, but the two approaches would appear to have the same purpose. However,
such an "adjunct faculty" approach would do nothing to accomplish the purpose identified by Justice
O'Connor of assuring that the "path to leadership" was "visibly open" to African-Americans, Hispanics
and Native Americans. Id. at 2341.
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The shift in emphasis in the majority opinion from "enriching every-
one's education" to cultivating "a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry," did not escape the scrutiny of Justice Thomas, whose
dissent found the shift "disturbing" because he saw it as an implicit repu-
diation of the principle that remedying societal discrimination can never
justify the government's use of racial classifications.3" He read the major-
ity opinion as implicitly justifying the law school's program because it
benefited minority students: "I believe that what lies beneath the Court's
decision today are the benighted notions that one can tell when racial dis-
crimination benefits (rather than hurts) minority groups and that racial dis-
crimination is necessary to remedy general societal ills."'" It is striking
that Justice Kennedy, in his separate dissent, interpreted the majority opin-
ion in much the same way, but unlike Justice Thomas, agreed with this
justification: "It is regrettable the Court's important holding allowing racial
minorities to have their special circumstances considered in order to im-
prove their educational opportunities is accompanied by a suspension of
the strict scrutiny which was the predicate of allowing race to be consid-
ered in the first place."32
What if both Justice Thomas and Kennedy are right that the majority
opinion in Grutter reopens the door, long thought shut tight,33 to the use of
affirmative action to remedy the effects of societal discrimination? But
what if what lies through that door is a much more demanding scrutiny of
the "special circumstances" (in the words of Justice Kennedy) that require
affirmative action to improve educational and other opportunities? For
example, will it be possible for schools like the University of Michigan not
only to justify affirmative action for African-Americans on the basis of
societal discrimination, instead of the educational benefit of diversity, but
even to justify giving greater preference to African-Americans than His-
panics on a showing that its pool of African-American applicants are more
seriously disadvantaged by societal discrimination than its Hispanic appli-
cants?
These questions seem to run aground on the frequently repeated judi-
cial assertion that the present effects of society-wide discrimination are
"inherently unmeasurable."34 However, India does not agree that effects of
30 Id. at 2362-63 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
31 Id. at 2361 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted).
32 Id. at 2374 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
33 Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO.
L. REv. 939, 941 (1997) ("Anyone who has read the Supreme Court cases knows that the Court does
not accept the remedying of past or present societal discrimination as an acceptable justification for
affirmative action.").
34 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion). It is important to remember that these assertions of "unmeasurability" are properly under-
stood as limitations only on the ability of courts to do such measuring, as made clear in the opinion of
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past societal discrimination are "inherently unmeasurable" and indeed has
constructed its affirmative action programs around an empirical project of
measuring such effects. India also does not follow the simplistic American
"one size fits all" approach under which any person who is a member of a
designated group is automatically eligible for affirmative action and all
designated groups are treated as needing the same type and degree of af-
firmative action.
India begins by dividing the universe of potential affirmative action
beneficiaries into three large categories: (1) descendants of the lowest caste
groups formerly termed "untouchables" labeled Scheduled Castes ("SCs")
for affirmative action purposes; (2) tribal groups isolated by culture, lan-
guage and geography termed Scheduled Tribes ("STs"); and (3) descen-
dants of lower caste groups whose ancestors were significantly disadvan-
taged but still located above the "untouchable" status, termed "Other
Backward Classes" ("OBCs"). 3  SCs and STs generally receive greater
preferential benefits than OBCs, typically a quota of entry-level govern-
ment positions that matches their proportion of the general population.
OBCs also are assigned a quota, but one that is typically much smaller than
their share of the population. This differentiation reflects a consensus that
the "untouchables" and "tribals" suffer from greater lingering effects of
past discrimination.36 If this system was roughly translated into an Ameri-
can context, African-Americans, as the descendants of slaves, and Native
Americans, as the survivors of extensive conquest and genocide, might
compare to the SCs and STs, and receive greater preference than Hispan-
ics, who, like the OBCs, would still receive a degree of affirmative ac-
Justice Powell in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), where these assertions origi-
nated:
Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent harm
suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to ex-
ceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classi-
fications.... As these preferences began to have their desired effect, and the conse-
quences of past discrimination were undone, new judicial rankings would be neces-
sary. The kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce
such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence--even if they oth-
erwise were politically feasible and socially desirable.
Id. at 295-97 (emphasis added).
35See Clark D. Cunningham & N.R. Madhava Menon, Race, Class, Caste ... ? Rethinking Af-
firmative Action, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1296, 1304 (1999); see also Clark D. Cunningham, Affirmative
Action: India's Example, 4 Civ. RTS. J. 22, 23 (1999). Both articles are also available on the Rethink-
ing Ejuality Website, supra note 18.
Rethinking Equality in the Global Society: An International Conference sponsored by the
Washington University School of Law and the Program on Social Thought and Analysis, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1561, 1657, 1659 (1997) (remarks of panelist M.N. Srinivas) [hereinafter Rethinking Equality
Conference]. The Rethinking Equality Conference is also available on the Rethinking Equality Web-




As I have described in greater detail elsewhere 38 designations of which
ethnic groups deserved OBC status were extensively litigated under the
equal protection provisions of India's constitution during the first 40 years
after India adopted its constitution in 1950. Finally, in 1979 the President
of India appointed a commission, known as the Mandal Commission, to
develop a comprehensive list of OBCs in an attempt to create national uni-
formity and consensus. The Mandal Commission conducted a national
survey that started with generally recognized group categories (typically
based on caste name or hereditary occupation) and tested each group using
standardized criteria of "backwardness," such as comparing the percentage
of group members who married before the age of 17 or did not complete
high school to other groups in the same Indian state. "Eleven numerical
factors, given varying weights, were assigned to each group based on the
survey results and those groups with total scores below a specified cut-off
point were then included in a list of OBCs."39 Although the methodology
and criteria used by the Mandal Commission have certainly been criticized,
India's approach still provides a striking contrast to that of the United
States in that the rules for selecting beneficiary groups were announced in
advance and then a transparent empirical process was used to apply those
rules to generate the list.'
As the result of a leading Supreme Court decision,4 India further
parses the set of persons eligible for affirmative action by virtue of mem-
bership in an OBC by applying an economic means test to a candidate's
parents (not to the candidate herself) to implement two related goals: (1) to
distribute affirmative benefits throughout each group rather than allowing a
relatively well-to-do "creamy layer" monopolize them, and (2) to deny
affirmative action benefits to individuals who do not really need them."
A comparative glance at India thus offers one vision of what might
await us on the other side of the door opened by the Grutter decision. This
vision of course not only can encourage bold new experimentation, but can
also caution us against unintended consequences. When India's Supreme
Court approved the major components of the Mandal Report in 1993, it
37This analogy is only offered as a way of understanding the system in India, not as an "import
model" proposal for changing American affirmative action.
38 Cunningham, supra note 35, at 23; Cunningham & Menon, supra note 35, at 1303-05; Clark D.
Cunningham, et al., Passing Strict Scrutiny: Using Social Science to Design Affirmative Action Pro-
grams, 90 GEO. L. J. 835, 874-78 (2002).
39 Cunningham et al., supra note 38, at 874-76.
40 Compare India's approach to the obscure way that the list of groups entitled to affirmative ac-
tion developed in American federal contracting. See id. at 859-73 (providing the history of America's
affirmative action plan).
41 Sawhney v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 477, 558-59.
42 Cunningham et al., supra note 38, at 876-77.
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optimistically characterized the methodology of the Mandal Commission
as moving India towards its aspiration of becoming a "casteless society,"
by "cleansing" the category of Other Backward Class from the prejudice
and stigma of the caste system.
Once a caste satisfies the criteria of backwardness, it be-
comes a backward class .... [From that point on] the classi-
fication is not on the basis of the caste but on the ground that
that caste is found to be a backward class not adequately rep-
resented in the services of the State. Born heathen, by bap-
tism, it becomes a Christian-to use a simile."3
However, in the decade since that decision, implementation of the
Mandal Report has led to widespread concern in India that caste identity
has become more salient, not less." The concern that the fruit of "strict
scrutiny" of group selection and definition might be a counter-productive
perpetuation of racial identity leads me to conclude with a totally different
perspective from David Sabbagh, a French scholar who comes from a legal
and cultural tradition that provides no affirmative action exception to an
official policy of total "color blindness."'45 Sabbagh points out that true
"color blindness" is a state of mind, like spontaneity, that can never come
into being through conscious effort or intention.' For example, the very
act of trying to be spontaneous prevents spontaneity. As a long-time stu-
dent of American affirmative action, he offers the following hypothesis:
"affirmative action . . . being ... a deliberate attempt at reducing the de-
gree of racial identification in the United States must be concealed in order
to achieve its intended effect." ' 7 Thus, although the designers and imple-
menters of affirmative action plans can never themselves be color-blind, he
suggests that they may, nonetheless, make progress toward a color-blind
society if they conceal from others their use of racial criteria. Sabbagh re-
interprets the diversity rationale of Justice Powell's Bakke opinion as tak-
ing this strategic principle and turning it into constitutional doctrine, ob-
serving that "provided universities conceal the rigidity of their affirmative
action programs carefully enough, they should be able to count on the
43 Sawhney, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. at 555.
44 See, e.g., Rethinking Equality Conference, supra note 36, at 1666, 1668 (remarks of N.R. Mad-
hava Menon); id. at 1659 (remarks of M.N. Srinivas).
45 Daniel Sabbagh, Judicial Uses of Subterfuge: Affirmative Action Reconsidered, 118 POL. SCI.
Q. 411, 417-18 (2003); see Thomas Kirszbaum, "Territorial Positive Discrimination" in French Urban
Policy 3 (Mar. 30, 2003) ("France has never seriously considered giving rights to individuals based on
ethnic or racial origin.") (working paper presented at Discrimination, Diversity and Public Policy
conference sponsored by the Program on Social Thought & Analysis at Washington University in St.
Louis) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).




Courts' [sic] benign passivity."48 His conclusion turns out be an accurate
prediction of the relationship between the decisions in Gratz and Grutter:
[T]he constitutional validity of affirmative action policies
practically depends upon whether the pervasive nature of race
consciousness in university admissions remains properly
concealed.
... Thus, any successful assault on affirmative action in the
near future will likely be mitigated by subterfuges of some
kind, whose underlying function is only to diminish the visi-
bility of race consciousness in contemporary America.:
If we apply Sabbagh's theory, the explicit "bonus point" system used
for undergraduate admission is indeed correctly struck down in Gratz be-
cause of its administrators' candor, as the Gratz dissenters complain."0
Meanwhile the law school's more hidden use of group identity survives
precisely because it obscures the impact of race on the formation of the law
school student body." Further, if Sabbagh's hypothesis is correct, Justice
O'Connor cannot admit in her Grutter and Gratz opinions that candor is
the legally relevant distinction because she herself must understate the role
of race in the law school's admission policies if the program sanctioned by
the Court is to accomplish its concealed goal of using race to reduce the
long-term salience of racial categories.
The drastically different implications of the Indian and French perspec-
tives underscore my insistence that I am not advocating that we "import"
either India's explicit and meticulous system for identifying groups who
deserve affirmative action nor France's official color-blindedness modified
by judicial subterfuge. But these two very different approaches can, I
think, help us think more clearly and creatively about the questions of
group definition and selection which stubbornly emerge from the Grutter
decision and which promise to hover over affirmative action controversies
to come.
48 Id. at 433.
49Id. at 434-35. 1 know these words were written before the decisions in Grutter and Gratz be-
cause I read them in March 2003 when Sabbagh presented a working version of this article at an inter-
national conference on Discrimination, Diversity and Public Policy sponsored by the Program on Social
Thought & Analysis at Washington University in St. Louis. He added a postscript about the Supreme
Court's decisions when the final version was printed in the fall of 2003. See id. at 435.
50 Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2438, 2442 (2003) (Souter, J. dissenting); id. at 2442, 2446
(Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding the narrowly tailored case of affirma-
tive action in admissions program).
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